When Defamation Pays More Than Sexual Assault

Rethinking how non-pecuniary harm is quantified

In Tulasne c. Rozon, 2026 QCCS 1075 (CanLII) damages were awarded to multiple victims who successfully established claims of sexual assault committed by Gilbert Rozon. The amounts granted ranged between 70 000 $ and 155 000 $ per claimant.

By contrast, in Herman c. Zajdel, 2023 QCCS 5251 (CanLII), the Superior Court awarded 200 000 $ in moral damages to a plaintiff who had been falsely portrayed as a “serial rapist”, namely on social media, despite the absence of sufficient evidence to establish any loss of income or other pecuniary damage.

The facts of the Herman case are, in themselves, disturbing. The defendant engaged in a sustained and public campaign, disseminating serious allegations across multiple platforms, including social media, communications with the plaintiff’s employer and even the publication of a self-edited book. The Court found that these allegations were false, that the defendant knew or ought to have known they were false, and that her conduct was intentional and malicious.

These cases arise in distinct legal contexts and engage different forms of wrongdoing. They are not directly comparable exercises.

However, when considered side by side, they raise a broader question regarding the manner in which civil law assesses and quantifies non-pecuniary harm.

In Quebec civil law, moral damages are intended to compensate for intangible prejudice, including injury to dignity, psychological suffering and damage to reputation. The assessment is necessarily contextual and fact-specific. Courts do not purport to establish a hierarchy of harms, but rather to evaluate the consequences of the wrongful conduct on the particular plaintiff.

That being said, the resulting awards may, in certain circumstances, give rise to an apparent tension.

Sexual violence presents unique evidentiary challenges. These cases frequently turn on credibility and involve deeply personal experiences. In recent years, the courts have recognized the harm caused to victim's physical integrity and dignity in matters of sexual violence. However, even where liability is established, the damages awarded have historically remained within a relatively conservative range typically ranging from 30 000 $ to 100 000 $.

Defamation, particularly in the context of social media, may give rise to immediate, widespread and enduring harm. Courts have recognized the amplifying effect of such conduct and, in appropriate cases, have awarded substantial moral damages, such as in the Herman case cited above, even in the absence of clearly quantifiable financial loss.

It thus remains difficult to ignore the discomfort that may arise where reputational harm is, in certain instances, compensated more heavily than proven sexual violence. This is not to suggest that one form of harm is more deserving of compensation than another, but rather to question whether the current framework consistently reflects the lived reality of those affected.

In my view, this comparison highlights both the inherent difficulty in quantifying non-economic harm and the limits of civil law in capturing the full scope of certain forms of prejudice.

It also underscores that further reflection may be warranted as to whether the system adequately protects and compensates women who are victims of sexual violence, particularly in light of the well-documented reluctance of many to come forward or assert their rights.

Civil law seeks to compensate. It does not always succeed in doing so in a manner that fully resonates with our collective sense of proportionality.